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CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING: JUST
ANOTHER FORM OF PAYDAY
LENDING?
PAIGE MARTA SKIBA∗ AND JEAN XIAO∗∗
I
INTRODUCTION
Consumer litigation funding is a controversial form of credit used by
plaintiffs. While his lawsuit is pending, a plaintiff can obtain a cash advance from
a financier who is not a party in the lawsuit. In exchange for the upfront cash, the
plaintiff owes the financier the principal plus interest and fees out of the proceeds
of the lawsuit. Such advances are nonrecourse in the sense that the financier
cannot obtain repayment outside of the case. If the lawsuit proceeds are less than
the total amount owed to the financier, the plaintiff must pay the financier only
the lawsuit proceeds; if the plaintiff loses the case, then he owes nothing. Despite
paying interest in exchange for a cash principal, this type of credit is not legally
considered a “loan” in most states. Therefore, this article uses the terms
“funding,” “litigation/legal funding,” “litigation/legal finance,” and “nonrecourse
loan/advance” interchangeably to refer to consumer litigation funding with the
caveat that the terminology for this credit product is currently being disputed.1
Opponents of funding have analogized it to payday lending because both
financial products involve high interest rates.2 Payday lending is another form of
high-cost, short-term credit. A consumer with proof of income and a bank
account can obtain a payday loan with an obligation to fully or partially pay back
the loan out of the consumer’s next paycheck.
In a 2015 case, Oasis Legal Finance Group, L.L.C. v. Coffman, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the same regulations that govern payday lending also
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1. Some states (for example, Colorado) consider funding a “loan” under state usury laws, but
others define it as a financial service distinct from a loan (for example, Ohio, where the term
“nonrecourse civil litigation advance” is used). See Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Coffman, 361 P.3d
400, 401 (Colo. 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2016).
2. Sara Warner, Like Payday Loans, Lawsuit Loans Increasingly Coming Under Fire,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2014, 1:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sara-warner/like-paydayloans-lawsuit_1_b_5692187.html [https://perma.cc/38A7-957Q].
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cover consumer litigation funding.3 Specifically, the court declared that such
funding constitutes a “loan” that is governed under the Uniform Consumer
Credit Act.4 In an amici curiae brief in support of Attorney General Coffman,
the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the Center for Responsible
Lending, the Consumer Federation of America, and the National Consumer Law
Center argued that legal finance companies were making loans to consumers.5
These organizations argued that lenders should not be able to skirt the state’s
usury regulation by manipulating the form of their financial services.6 In support
of their position, they cited multiple situations in which payday lenders have
attempted to dodge state governance.7 In the past, payday lenders have
unsuccessfully argued that the advances they gave to consumers were not loans
but instead deferred deposits of checks, sales of gift certificates, or Internet
service transactions.8
But is consumer litigation funding just another form of payday lending, or are
consumer advocacy organizations mistaken by grouping these two types of credit
together? How should consumer litigation funding be governed? Optimal
regulation of financial products requires policymakers to understand how the
services operate and how consumers respond to them. State legislatures are
rapidly addressing legal finance as it rises in popularity. Currently, nine states
have stable laws in place to govern nonrecourse advances,9 and many others are
considering bills that would implement statutory provisions to govern these
advances.10 As regulators decide on an approach to address funding, they should
not hastily group funding and payday lending together—they need to understand
the nuances of these two business practices and their consequences for
consumers.
This article provides a side-by-side comparison of payday lending and
consumer litigation funding in order to aid policymakers. First, part II describes
how these two alternative credit sources work and how borrowers use their cash
advances. This article is the first to employ a large dataset from a national legal
financier and provide an empirical analysis of the usage of legal finance. The
findings demonstrate that the percentages of consumers that spend funding on
3. Oasis, 361 P.3d at 401; Jacob Gershman, Payday Lending Rules Apply to Litigation Funding,
Colorado Court Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/11/17/
payday-lending-rules-apply-to-litigation-funding-colorado-court-rules/ [https://perma.cc/9SJV-G5YG].
4. Oasis, 361 P.3d at 401.
5. Brief Amici Curiae of National Association of Consumer Advocates et al. in Support of
Respondents at 12, Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400 (Colo. 2015) (No. 2013SC497)
[hereinafter Consumer Organizations’ Brief].
6. Id. at 32.
7. Id. at 32–36.
8. Id.; see also Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 18–25 (2002) (describing how payday lenders have disguised their loans).
9. See infra Table 3.
10. Heather Morton, Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions 2015 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF
ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/
litigation-or-lawsuit-funding-transactions-2015-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/PA87-9D9Y].
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utilities, car payments, bills, rent, mortgage payments, food, and unexpected
expenses are comparable to the percentages of consumers that spend payday
loans on these living expenses. Thus, on the surface, these two forms of high-cost
credit that lie outside of the traditional banking system appear similar.11 Beneath
the surface, though, many differences emerge. There are two traits unique to legal
finance on which policy guidelines should turn: funding is nonrecourse—in other
words, financiers cannot collect anything beyond the lawsuit proceeds—and
funding is tied to the complex litigation process.
Because funding is nonrecourse, its customers cannot fall into the debt spiral
that regulators often worry about with respect to payday lending.12 However, this
does not mean that nonrecourse advances are innocuous. Using wisdom from the
behavioral economics literature, part III explains that funding’s relationship to
litigation obscures its effect on the consumer’s cash flow and that the involvement
of litigation adds a layer of complexity and uncertainty to calculating the price of
funding, a problem not implicated by payday loans. All in all, consumers may
have an even more difficult time understanding the true cost of legal finance than
that of payday loans.
Finally, part IV examines three types of policies—bans, restrictions on loan
characteristics, and disclosure laws—that have been used to regulate payday
lending and explores whether analogous laws would effectively govern funding
and ensure that the product is transparent to consumers. From an economics
perspective, policymakers should prohibit funding only when this financial
product on net harms consumers. Empirical research is central to understanding
whether this product will harm or help borrowers. A ban would not be the best
approach at this time for two reasons: the legal finance industry has not reached
a competitive equilibrium, and little empirical evidence currently exists as to the
consumer welfare effects of funding. Restrictions on loan characteristics, such as
caps on interest or limits on duration, would not be ideal because they are hard
to implement, hurt low-income borrowers, and may be evaded by financiers.
However, disclosure laws, coupled with attorney acknowledgments, would
provide effective consumer protection because these laws could help plaintiffs
understand the true cost of nonrecourse loans—something that is currently
difficult given funding’s tie to litigation, a complicated process with an uncertain
end date.
This article makes the following two policy recommendations. First, to
remedy the lack of empirical research upon which policymakers can make
effective and educated decisions, states should partner with financiers to gather
data on customer characteristics and outcomes in order to study the effects of

11. See Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in
the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 95 (2008) (arguing that litigation funding fits into the wide
subprime lending market that includes payday lending).
12. See, e.g., David Silberman, We’ve Proposed a Rule to Protect Consumers from Payday Debt
Traps, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU BLOG (June 2, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/blog/weve-proposed-rule-protect-consumers-payday-debt-traps/ [https://perma.cc/N5PK-9KV3].
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funding on consumer welfare. Some states currently have reporting requirements
for financiers,13 but because such data are at the aggregate level, they are not
useful for analyzing consumer well-being. Second, to address the difficulty in
comprehending the true cost of funding, states should implement robust
disclosure laws that differ from those currently in place. Nine states have imposed
funding disclosure requirements that are similar to those in the Truth in Lending
Act for payday lending.14 These laws require, for example, a minimum font size,
itemization of one-time fees, a schedule of repayments, and disclosure of the
annual percentage rate (APR). In the funding context, however, these disclosures
do not help plaintiffs understand the loans. Plaintiffs do not have legal expertise
and likely lack the financial sophistication necessary to estimate when a
nonrecourse advance will be due and how much the eventual interest and fees
will amount to. Even for the savviest plaintiffs, such computations would be
difficult. Financiers should use data analysis to provide borrowers an expected
payment date and expected total payment—rather than just providing the APR
and a schedule of the amount owed for a series of six-month intervals. Further,
in order to prevent financiers from burying the cost disclosures deep in contracts
or pressuring plaintiffs into signing without reading the disclosures, the disclosure
laws should be coupled with attorney-acknowledgment provisions. These
provisions, which five states have implemented, require attorneys to provide
written acknowledgments to verify that costs of funding have been disclosed to
the plaintiffs.15
II
PAYDAY LENDING VERSUS CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING:
FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
A payday loan is a one-to-two-week cash advance of no more than $1,000.16
Lenders charge about 10–20% per $100, which is equivalent to a 260–520 APR.17
Payday lending has pervaded the universe of alternative credit in the United
States: there are over twenty thousand payday outlets, more than the number of
McDonald’s, J.C. Penney, and Target outlets nationwide.18 A customer typically
applies for a payday loan by going to a brick-and-mortar lender and supplying
proof of income and personal information; personal information can include the
customer’s government-issued identification, monthly bills, and most recent

13. See ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-107 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3309 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 8, § 2260 (2016).
14. See infra Table 3.
15. See IND. CODE § 24-12-2-1 (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-104 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 253303 (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2016); TENN. CODE § 47-16-104 (2016).
16. Neil Bhutta et al., Payday Loan Choices and Consequences, 47 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
223, 227 (2015).
17. Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023,
1027 (2012).
18. Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2007, at 169, 169–70.
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checking account statement.19 Though some payday lenders obtain a subprime
credit score to evaluate loan applications,20 a consumer’s payday loan obligations
and repayment behavior, including default, are not reported to the national credit
bureaus, such as Equifax. Thus, payday lending does not directly affect the
consumer’s traditional credit score.21
To obtain a payday loan, the customer writes a postdated check or agrees
online to a debit authorization that covers the loan amount plus interest and
fees.22 The lender can cash the check or debit the account on or after the loan’s
due date—that is, the customer’s subsequent payday.23 Borrowers may also “roll
over,” or renew, their loan by paying the associated fees. They will then gain an
extra earnings cycle to pay off the principal and any additional interest.24
Rollovers are the norm. According to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 80% of payday loans are renewed within fourteen days.25 A study
conducted in 2014 showed that 50% of all payday loans were in a renewal chain
at least ten loans long.26 Approximately 48% of new consumers roll over their
loans at least once.27 While payday loan use may be perfectly rational for cashconstrained consumers,28 critics view renewals as evidence of a debt trap:
“borrowers are tempted into borrowing $300 for two weeks expecting to pay $45,
but wind up paying many times that amount as they borrow repeatedly.”29
Approximately five million payday loan customers get caught in this cycle of debt
a year, estimated to cost them $3.4 billion annually.30 Payday loans may also
indirectly affect consumers’ ability to pay off other debts.31
According to a report issued by the Pew Charitable Trusts, 53% of borrowers
used their first payday loan for utilities, car payments, credit card bills, or
prescription drugs; 10% for mortgage or rent; 5% for food; 16% for unexpected
expenses such as emergency medical bills; and 8% for “something special” such

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Bhutta et al., supra note 16, at 227.
E.g., id. at 239–40.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 227–28.
KATHLEEN BURKE ET AL., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY
LENDING 4 (2014).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4–5.
28. See Skiba, supra note 17, at 1026–27 (“From an economist’s perspective, credit in general allows
consumers to smooth consumption over time, meaning that they borrow from future good times to help
make it through current tough times.”).
29. DONALD P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT
NO. 309, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS 9 (2008).
30. KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST
OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2004), http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/
research-analysis/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM8S-UG5B].
31. See Bhutta et al., supra note 16, at 228 (“[Payday] loans affect consumers’ ability to meet their
financial obligations in general.”).

SKIBA_XIAO_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE)

122

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

5/10/2017 9:52 PM

[Vol. 80:117

as gifts, vacation, or entertainment.32 The Payday Loans column in Table 1
depicts this breakdown. The fact that 68% of borrowers are using their payday
loans for living expenses suggests that consumers are using these loans as a last
resort. Empirical research supports the notion that payday loan customers are
liquidity-constrained. Both Carter and Bos et al. provide evidence that such
customers are using pawnshops as a second form of credit to help meet their
payday loan interest payments and roll over their loans.33 According to Agarwal
et al., consumers’ liquidity dramatically deteriorates in the five months before
they take out payday loans.34 Carter et al. show that credit union members who
borrowed from payday lenders had lower levels of liquidity than the members
who did not.35
In consumer litigation funding, a personal injury plaintiff can obtain a $500 to
$100,000 cash advance in return for repayment of the principal plus interest and
fees from the lawsuit proceeds.36 The plaintiff can apply for funding anytime prior
to the resolution of the case. The maximum advance is much larger than the
maximum payday loan principal—$1000. Like those in payday lending, the
interest rates in funding are high: they can vary from 2–15% per month, resulting
in APRs over 200%.37 Unlike payday lending, which mostly occurs at physical
outlets, most consumer legal finance takes place online.38 A plaintiff can fill out
an application for a cash advance on the Internet and communicate with the
funder via telephone.39 Whereas payday loan applications focus on the
32. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY
BORROW, AND WHY 14 (2012). Survey participants were asked: Thinking back now to (that FIRST/the)
time you took out a (online payday loan/payday loan/auto title loan), which of the following best
describes what specifically you needed the money for?
1. To pay rent or a mortgage
2. To pay for food and groceries
3. To pay a regular expense, such as utilities, car payment, credit card bill, or prescription drugs
4. To pay an unexpected expense, such as a car repair or emergency medical expense
5. To pay for something special, such as a vacation, entertainment, or gifts
6. (Do not read) Other (specify).
Id. 7% of respondents replied with something other than the categories above. Id.
33. See Marieke Bos et al., Balancing Act: New Evidence and a Discussion of the Theory on the
Rationality and Behavioral Anomalies of Choice in Credit Markets, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler eds., forthcoming);
Susan Payne Carter, Payday Loan and Pawnshop Usage: The Impact of Allowing Payday Loan Rollovers,
49 J. CONSUMER AFF. 436, 436 (2015).
34. See Sumit Agarwal et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring
Puzzles?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 412, 415 (2009).
35. See Susan Payne Carter et al., Pecuniary Mistakes? Payday Borrowing by Credit Union
Members, in FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL
MARKETPLACE 145, 148 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Annamaria Lusardi eds., 2011).
36. Jean Xiao, Note, Heuristics, Biases, and Consumer Litigation Funding at the Bargaining Table,
68 VAND. L. REV. 261, 265 (2015).
37. Id.
38. See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 85, 85–86 (2002) (“There are now many small, private firms advertising on the Internet
that will give plaintiffs money in exchange for a share of the proceeds of the litigation . . . .”).
39. See, e.g., Apply Now in Seconds, OASIS FIN., https://www.oasisfinancial.com/apply/ApplyForm/
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consumer’s ability to pay (that is, proof of income and bank account in good
standing), funding applications focus on basic information about the lawsuit. The
financier assesses the strength of the consumer’s case by looking at factors such
as potential damages and the likelihood of gaining a favorable settlement or
winning the trial.40 The funder also gathers information on attorney’s fees and
other debts that would take priority, such as medical liens.41
With the exception of some financiers checking to see whether plaintiffs have
filed for bankruptcy, consumer credit status is unimportant because repayment
comes from lawsuit proceeds.42 Attorneys disburse repayments from case
proceeds to funders after attorney’s fees and debts to other higher-priority
creditors are paid.43 As with payday lending, a plaintiff’s funding obligations and
repayment behavior are not reported to the national credit bureaus.44 Therefore,
legal finance does not directly affect the plaintiff’s traditional credit score.
Because repayment comes from the leftover case proceeds, if any, the plaintiff
pays either the full amount due to the funder or the entire remaining portion of
the case proceeds—whichever amount is less.45 If the plaintiff loses the lawsuit,
he pays nothing.46 This is why a funding advance is often referred to as a
nonrecourse loan. This configuration does not allow a plaintiff to roll over his
debt.47 The due date of the principal and interest is the date of case resolution.
Because of the nonrecourse nature of the advance, funding consumers cannot fall
into the cycle of interest payments that payday loan consumers do.
Funding cannot cause borrowers to fall into a debt cycle directly but can affect
borrowers’ financial health indirectly. Plaintiffs who take out nonrecourse loans
may obtain considerably lower proceeds from the lawsuit because of the high
interest and fees. After paying the financier, consumers might fall into higher
levels of debt elsewhere. This is analogous to the situation in which payday
borrowers go to pawnshops to repay payday loans.48 That is, credit demand spills
over into other markets because of the interest paid to the first lender.
For example, assume that a plaintiff will receive a $10,000 settlement in two
years. He owes 30% of the $10,000 to his attorney, and for his $1,000 cash advance
[https://perma.cc/TUP5-7PDR] (last visited Aug. 19, 2016).
40. Xiao, supra note 36, at 265.
41. Nicholas Beydler, Comment, Risky Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating Consumer
Litigation Funding, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2012).
42. Id.
43. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(6)(c) (West 2016) (explaining that the legal services
provider will disburse the lawsuit proceeds owed to the funder).
44. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2254(a)(11) (2016) (“A consumer litigation funding company shall
not . . . [r]eport a consumer to a credit reporting agency if insufficient funds remain from the net proceeds
to repay the company.”).
45. Xiao, supra note 36, at 263.
46. Id.
47. If a plaintiff wanted more cash, he could seek another funder to buy out the first funder’s cash
advance. The first funder can choose to buy out its own advance if it learns from the attorney that the
plaintiff’s case value has significantly increased.
48. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 32, at 16, 17.
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from a funder, he owes $3,400 at the end of his case. Without funding, he gets
$7,000 in two years. With funding, he gets $4,600 on net, after paying the attorney
and financier. With $2,400 in interest going to the funder, the consumer may have
to use credit cards to pay off his mortgage, car expenses, and other debts that he
could not cover with the $4,600. Credit card rates are high, and he may
accumulate many months of debt. If an option other than funding was available
to get a $1,000 advance, then the consumer may not have needed to take out the
credit card loan. In this analysis, it is important to note that taking the $1,000
funding at the beginning may have been perfectly rational and that he may have
ended up in a worse financial position without it. The point of this example is to
illustrate a potential indirect effect of nonrecourse advances: a consumer may
seek high-interest credit options after his lawsuit has resolved because of the
large, and potentially unexpected, amount going to the funder.
The populations of payday lending and consumer litigation funding
customers are not mutually exclusive, but they also do not completely overlap.
Payday lending requires a current inflow of income and a checking account.
Funding has no such requirements, and plaintiffs may be cut off from their source
of income temporarily or permanently after their accidents. While commentators
have reported that nonrecourse advances are generally used on living essentials,49
this article examines data from a national funder and provides more specific
statistics on the usage of these advances.
The data are from a national legal financier for advances that the company
made from 2014 to 2015 (N=37,799).50 Data include the date of the plaintiff’s
funding and his geographic location. Upon receipt of the funding, each consumer
wrote a couple of lines about the expected use of their advance. Key words in
consumers’ answers, such as “mortgage” and “utilities,” were used to formulate
categories comparable to the ones in the Pew Charitable Trusts payday lending
study.51 Because customers could write down several things for which they would
use their funds, percentages were calculated both exclusively—where the

49. See Martin, supra note 11, at 84–85; Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems
Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503,
514 (2006).
50. We had data from 2011 to 2013 and 2016 for some, but not all, consumers. Results are very
similar when calculated with 2011–2016 data. The national financier was promised anonymity in exchange
for participating in this study. Researchers interested in accessing this data should contact the authors for
more information.
51. Below are the key words used to form the categories:
1. Regular expenses = “utility,” “electric,” “water,” “internet,” “lights,” “car,” “vehicle,”
“bill,” “payment,” “drug,”
2. Mortgage/rent = “mortgage,” “rent,” “apt,” “home,” “house,”
3. Food = “food,” “grocer[y, ies],”
4. Unexpected expenses = “medical,” “emergency,” “funeral,” “crisis”
5. Gifts/vacation/entertainment = “gift,” “present,” “holiday,” “Christmas,” “vacation”
6. Money/Income Needed = “money,” “income.”
Note: The programming picked up multiple endings of these words (for example, “car” and
“cars”).

SKIBA_XIAO_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2017]

5/10/2017 9:52 PM

CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING

125

consumer does not mention key words in any other category—and nonexclusively.
Table 1 depicts the results. Under the exclusive reporting method, about 38%
of plaintiffs used their advances for regular expenses, 7% for mortgage or rent,
1% for food, 2% for unexpected expenses, and 1% for gifts, vacation, and
entertainment; 7% indicated two or more of these five categories, whereas 4%
expressly indicated that money was needed but did not state the purpose for
which it was needed. Under the non-exclusive reporting method, about 44% of
plaintiffs spent their advances on regular expenses, 12% on mortgage or rent, 2%
on food, 2% on unexpected expenses, and 1% on gifts, vacation, and
entertainment; 9% stated expressly in their comments that money was needed.
Calculations show that 51% indicated categories one to three, which consist of
living expenses, without indicating categories four or five. This is lower than the
payday lending statistic of 68% but still comparable. The percentage may be
lower due to the freeform way in which consumers recorded the use(s) of their
advances.
Table 1. Consumer Use of Payday Loans and Litigation Funding52
Category

Regular Expenses
(utilities, car
payments, bills)
Mortgage or Rent
Food
Unexpected
Expenses
(emergency,
medical expenses)
Gifts, Vacation, or
Entertainment
Indicated that
Money/Income was
Needed
More Than One
Category

Payday Loans
(%)
53

Litigation
Funding
(Exclusive %)
38

Litigation
Funding (NonExclusive %)
44

10
5
16

7
1
2

12
2
2

8

1

1

---

4

9

---

7

---

52. The statistics about payday loans in this table come from a 2012 study by the Pew Charitable
Trusts, cited in footnote 32. The statistics about consumer litigation funding are calculations the authors
made with data from a national legal financier.
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Similar to those of payday lending, consumers of litigation finance are using
their nonrecourse loans for living expenses, which signals that these plaintiffs are
cash-constrained. Though no empirical studies confirm that these customers are
indeed liquidity-constrained, several commentators have opined that this is the
case.53 Both Rodak and Martin have recognized the comparability of legal
finance to other subprime forms of lending.54 Litigation funding can “provide[]
opportunities for low-income borrowers to buy homes, cars[,] and other goods by
obtaining credit that is unavailable to them in the prime market”55 and can
“empower people without access to more traditional credit sources.”56
In sum, both payday lending and consumer legal funding are alternative credit
sources that lie outside of mainstream banking. Both types of credit involve high
interest rates, and a majority of borrowers of both use their cash advances on
living essentials. On the surface, it appears that these two markets and the
customers who populate them are quite similar. However, looking more in-depth,
this is not the case. The most poignant differences are that funding is nonrecourse
and repayment is tied to litigation. Unlike that of payday lenders, the focus of
funders is not on a consumer’s ability to pay, but instead on the performance of
the asset, which is the plaintiff’s case. Because funding is nonrecourse, legal
finance customers cannot get into the spiral of debt that payday customers can.
Further, payday loan contracts are simple. Even if borrowers do not understand
compounding interest, they know the due date of their cash advance (that is, their
next payday) and the amount due. Although payday borrowers likely understand
their obligations to the lender, they may mispredict their ability to repay,57
whereas funding plaintiffs are unlikely to comprehend their obligations to the
financier in the first place; funding’s tie to litigation complicates the repayment
calculus. In order to estimate the total interest and fees owed, a plaintiff must
accurately predict the size and date of his settlement, a date which is often years
into the future. Part III provides evidence on these points.
III
A BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
Traditional economic theory tells us that consumers decide whether or not to
take a cash advance with repayment down the road by balancing the anticipated

53. See, e.g., STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE
UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 10, 12 (2010) (“Presumably, then, most recipients
of non-recourse loans either have exhausted their ability to obtain financing from more common sources
or they are attracted to legal funding because they like the fact that the amount they must repay can be
no larger than the amount they recover from their lawsuits.”).
54. Martin, supra note 11, at 84–85; Rodak, supra note 49, at 514 (citation omitted).
55. Rodak, supra note 49, at 514.
56. Martin, supra note 11, at 85.
57. Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan Borrowers, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 105,
123 tbl.2 (2013) (showing that approximately 40% of borrowers mispredict how long it will take for them
to repay their payday loan).
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monetary and nonmonetary benefits against current and future costs.58 Despite
often being labeled as predatory, high-interest credit products can be completely
rational when customers have no other credit options and the benefit of $300
today outweighs the cost of forgoing $300 plus fees the next pay period. However,
empirical studies from behavioral economics have documented that borrowers
are not perfectly rational and are indeed susceptible to shortcomings and biases
during the decisionmaking process.59 For example, Skiba and Tobacman found
that over half of payday loan customers defaulted within one year of their first
loan and that those who defaulted typically had already repaid or serviced five
loans, a sign that borrowers were failing to optimize their well-being.60 The
authors discovered that this behavior was not consistent with a rational model of
decisionmaking but instead better aligned with a model that captures
mispredictions about self-control behavior and future patience (the so-called
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model).61 That is, the consumer is not as patient as
he believes he will be in the future,62 leading him to mispredict the likelihood of
successfully retiring his debt the next payday. This part of the article uses insights
from behavioral economics to explain how borrowers may interact with payday
lending and funding differently in the decisionmaking process. Particularly, it
elaborates on how legal finance’s tie to litigation obscures its effect on the
consumer’s cash flow and complicates the calculus of repayment.
First, funding’s relationship to lawsuits hides its impact on consumers’ cash
flow due to the effects of salience, differential mental accounting, and lack of the
pain of payment.63 Research has shown that customers do not heed certain
components of price and thus underestimate price if these components are not
salient.64 Consumers automatically pay more attention to product features that
are different from the typical characteristics in a “reference” product,65 while they
have to exert more cognitive effort to consider less salient product attributes.66
Payday loan features are quite standard in the realm of lending. The benefit is
the upfront cash; the costs are the interest and fees. Consumers can see that these
costs come out of their paychecks. Even though borrowers may not understand
how annualized interest rates work,67 borrowers are well aware that they owe, for
58. See Bos et al., supra note 33.
59. See generally Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 315 (2009).
60. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and Discounting:
Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default 1–3 (Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Research
Paper No. 08-33, 2008).
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 9.
63. See infra notes 64–74.
64. See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
1145, 1145 (2009) (finding that “consumers underreact to taxes that are not salient”).
65. See Pedro Bordalo et al., Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1243, 1243–44
(2012).
66. Chetty et al., supra note 64, at 1165.
67. See Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of Financial Literacy:
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example, a $300 principal plus $60 in fees the next payday. In contrast, litigation
funding is more opaque. Repayment of an advance comes out of the income the
plaintiff receives in the form of a settlement or trial award. Because, procedurally,
repayment comes out of the one-time case proceeds rather than regular income,
funding’s effect on income is not salient, and consumers are likely to
underestimate the costs of legal finance, which are realized years after the
advances are disbursed to plaintiffs. Not only are the costs less salient than those
of payday lending but the benefits are more salient. Unlike most financial
products that provide upfront cash, funding is nonrecourse. This striking
difference will lead customers to focus on the fact that they cannot get into a debt
spiral and to pay more attention to the benefits than the costs of obtaining an
advance.
Differential mental accounting and the lack of pain of payment only worsen
the undervaluation of costs and accentuation of benefits. Research demonstrates
that consumers do not perceive all money to be equal—in other words, money is
not fungible.68 People judge money differently based on the source of the funds.69
Though it is clear to customers that payday loan repayments come out of their
bank accounts, they may not consider settlement or trial award money as a part
of their income because they categorize the cash distinctly in their minds.
Consumers may be more willing to spend money from their lawsuit proceeds than
from other sources of income, such as wages, to pay for funding, simply due to
the different mental labels they put on the accounts.
Research also shows that a customer experiences pain or disutility when he
spends money to pay for a good or service, potentially through loss aversion.70
When the consumer gives the money to the vendor, the amount of money in his
bank account decreases. If his reference point was the level of money in the
account prior to the payment, then he experiences a “loss.”71 Psychologically, this
loss negatively impacts him more than an addition to his account of the same
magnitude would positively impact him.72 Thus, when making decisions, people
tend to avoid the choice that they perceive will result in loss.73 The role of the
pain associated with loss is to mitigate consumer overestimation of benefits and
underestimation of costs during the decisionmaking process.74 For payday
lending, this disutility comes every two weeks when the consumer pays off either
Theory and Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 12 (2014) (summarizing studies in which consumers
did not understand compounding interest).
68. See generally Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
183 (1999) (giving an overview of research demonstrating that not money is not fungible).
69. Id. at 196–97.
70. See Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings
and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4, 25 (1998).
71. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A ReferenceDependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991).
72. See id. (“[L]osses and disadvantages have greater impact on preferences than gains and
advantages.”).
73. See id. at 1057.
74. Prelec & Loewenstein, supra note 70, at 25.
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the whole loan plus interest or that term’s interest. However, for litigation
funding plaintiffs, this disutility likely never occurs. After a case resolves, the
attorney usually disburses the principal, interest, and fees that are owed to the
financier and then gives the plaintiff any remaining proceeds. Because the
plaintiff does not write a check or physically make a payment to the financier, he
does not experience the loss associated with his cash advance.
Second, funding’s tie to litigation complicates the repayment calculus. The
price of payday lending is initially clear: the consumer has to pay $10–$20 per
$100 borrowed per pay cycle. On the other hand, the price of funding is complex
even at the outset because of the financial service’s relationship to lawsuits. A
simple example illustrates this point. Assume that a financier follows the
industry’s best disclosure practices, which have been incorporated into disclosure
regulations by some states,75 and provides the following repayment schedule for
a $1,000 cash advance with a 10% additive monthly interest rate76:
Total amount to be repaid by consumer
if at 6 months:
$1,600
if at 12 months:
$2,200
if at 18 months:
$2,800
if at 24 months:
$3,400
if at 30 months:
$4,000
if at 36 months:
$4,600
if at 42 months:
$5,200
For any other financial product, this type of repayment schedule adequately
informs consumers because the length of time depends on factors that are not
directly related to the product. For payday lending, repayment duration depends
on spending and borrowing in other areas of the customer’s life. However, for
funding, repayment depends on the outcome of the associated asset—the case.
Personal injury plaintiffs do not have the necessary financial or legal expertise
to evaluate potential lawsuit outcomes or the ability to compute corresponding
probabilities (for example, a 62% chance of settling at $X in nine months or a
38% chance of winning a trial award of $Y in twenty-five months). A huge
portion of the U.S. population is neither financially nor contractually literate.77
Many people lack an understanding of numeracy (that is, “the capacity to do a
simple calculation related to compounding of interest rates”), inflation, and risk
diversification.78 Research shows that those who are less financially sophisticated
75. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-104 (2016).
76. Interest rates are not necessarily additive for all funders; interest rates can be compounded. We
use an additive rate for simplicity.
77. See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 67, at 11–12 (summarizing the results of existing empirical
studies on financial literacy in the U.S. adult population); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield,
Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 237–38 (2002) (concluding that millions of
Americans have low contractual literary).
78. Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 67, at 10 (explaining what constitutes financial literacy).
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are more likely to make investment mistakes and engage in high-cost borrowing
like payday loans.79 Additionally, many people are unable to extract important
aspects of transactions from lengthy and complex contract documents.80 Thus,
even with a payment schedule like the one above, plaintiffs will be unable to
compute a reasonable estimate of the actual price of the nonrecourse advance.
IV
WHAT POLICIES ARE OPTIMAL?
Parts II and III reviewed the similarities and differences between payday
lending and consumer litigation funding. Part IV takes stock of the types of
policies that have been implemented to regulate payday loans and explores
whether similar policies would make sense for nonrecourse advances.
Specifically, it examines bans, restrictions on loan characteristics, and disclosure
regulations. From an economics perspective, policymakers should ban funding
only when the credit product on net harms consumers. Empirical studies are
critical to understanding how the product will affect borrowers. Because the legal
finance industry is still developing and little empirical research on how funding
affects consumer welfare is available at this time, states should not pursue bans.
States should also not enact restrictions on loan characteristics for three reasons:
it is difficult to find the optimal parameters for such restrictions; such restrictions
would likely negatively impact low-income borrowers; and financiers may
strategically act to render these restrictions ineffective. Part IV concludes by
arguing for a disclosure policy, coupled with attorney acknowledgment, to help
customers understand the true costs of funding.
A. Bans
Prohibition of a financial service is not justified unless it is on net detrimental
to consumers. Table 2 depicts the state policies that currently govern payday
lending. Fourteen states have expressly banned payday loans.81 Existing
empirical literature does not come to a consensus regarding the effect of payday
loans on borrowers. There is as much research showing that payday loans help
consumers as there is demonstrating that these loans harm them.82
Payday loans may raise the probability of borrowers experiencing negative
financial consequences: Melzer found that payday loan access increased financial
79. See id. at 21–23 (summarizing the results of studies on financial literacy and economic
outcomes).
80. White & Mansfield, supra note 77, at 240.
81. Skiba, supra note 17, at 1043.
82. See generally John P. Caskey, Payday Lending: New Research and the Big Question, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY 681 (Philip N. Jefferson ed., 2012). Economists
treat the issue of whether payday lending increases or decreases social welfare as an empirical question.
Thus, this article does not focus on nonempirical studies. For a source that makes the case for why
households should be protected from payday lending from a nonempirical perspective, see generally
Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians from Payday
Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649 (2012).
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hardship with respect to paying bills,83 Skiba and Tobacman demonstrated that
having a payday loan raised the likelihood of a personal bankruptcy filing,84 and
Campbell et al. showed that access to payday lending resulted in a hike in
involuntary bank account closures.85 Further, Carrell and Zinman discovered that
the presence of payday lending increased the likelihood of adverse work
outcomes among Air Force employees.86
However, others have shown that payday lending has positive effects as an
alternative credit source. Morgan and Strain demonstrated that banning payday
loans led to a rise in check bouncing (a more costly alternative to taking out a
payday loan), complaints to the Federal Trade Commission (a proxy for the level
of informal bankruptcy), and Chapter 7 bankruptcies.87 Zinman found that after
a restrictive payday lending law passed in Oregon, check bouncing and the
likelihood of adverse events, such as job loss, increased.88 Morse provided
evidence that payday loans aided people in financial distress after natural
disasters.89 Hynes showed that personal bankruptcy filings did not rise after states
legalized payday lending and, in fact, fell in areas with large military
communities.90 Dobbie and Skiba demonstrated that greater payday loan
principals decrease default rates, suggesting that the money is used to help
customers manage their budget.91 These studies cast doubt on the assertion that
payday lending is generally bad for borrowers. Bans are not necessarily the best
policy because they take away a credit source that may assist in times of need and
that may deter consumers from engaging in more costly financial behaviors, such
as writing a check when there are insufficient bank account funds.
Most states have not yet passed legislation to address legal finance; nor have
most state supreme courts addressed a challenge to these cash advances. There
are currently no express prohibitions on funding. The Ohio Supreme Court
previously banned funding in 2003, but the Ohio legislature overturned this
policy in 2008.92 Table 3 reports the state policies that currently govern
nonrecourse advances.

83. See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending Market,
126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 519 (2011).
84. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 1 (Vanderbilt
Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 11-13, 2011).
85. Dennis Campbell et al., Bouncing Out of the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of
Involuntary Bank Account Closures, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 1224, 1224–25 (2012).
86. Scott Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military Personnel
Performance, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2805, 2808 (2014).
87. MORGAN & STRAIN, supra note 29, at 1, 3.
88. See Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey Evidence on
Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 546, 546–47 (2010).
89. Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains?, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 28, 28 (2011).
90. Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607,
607 (2012).
91. Will Dobbie & Paige Marta Skiba, Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets:
Evidence from Payday Lending, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Oct. 2013, at 256, 256.
92. Xiao, supra note 36, at 274.
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Prohibitions should be instituted only if nonrecourse advances are on net bad
for consumers. Because funding is a recent phenomenon, little empirical work
exists that evaluates the effect of these advances on consumer welfare. In a
working paper, Xiao examines the effect of access to funding on personal
bankruptcy and finds that access reduces the Chapter 7 and 13 filing rates.93 As
more researchers conduct empirical studies, it is plausible that, as in the case of
payday loans, research on the consequences of using funding will not come to a
consensus on its net effects on borrowers. Further, unlike the situation in the
payday loan industry, legal finance rates likely have not fully stabilized and
equilibrated because the funding industry is still growing. More firms will
continue to enter and drive the rates down, potentially shifting the consequences
for plaintiffs. Thus, at this time, states should not ban nonrecourse loans.
Instead, states should engage in data collection efforts and partner with
financiers to systematically evaluate long-term consumer outcomes. Maine,
Nebraska, and Vermont all mandate that financiers report aggregate data on
their businesses including the total number of nonrecourse loans made, the
aggregate dollar amount of such fundings, and the total amount charged to
customers including interest and one-time fees.94 However, these reporting
requirements do not go far enough. States should instead seek data on individual
transactions and partner with financiers to conduct telephone surveys to obtain
consumer outcome data on how many consumers ended up in bankruptcy,
whether the financing carried plaintiffs over to their next paycheck, and similar
inquiries.
B. Restrictions On Loan Characteristics
In terms of regulating payday loan characteristics, thirty states have capped
interest rates, thirty-three have capped loan sizes, thirty-five have restricted loan
lengths, and thirty-three have limited rollovers.95 Colorado, New Hampshire,
Ohio, and Montana have interest rate caps so low that it is unprofitable for most
financiers to operate in these states.96 Thus, these states have effectively banned
payday lending without certain empirical evidence that payday loans are on net
bad for borrowers.97 Economic research on consumer behavior suggests that the
second and third measures—capping loan sizes and restricting loan lengths—may
be ineffective, but the fourth—limiting rollovers—may yield positive results.
Dobbie and Skiba found that a larger loan size led to a lower likelihood of

93. See Jean Xiao, The Effect of Consumer Litigation Funding on Bankruptcy (Working Paper,
2017).
94. ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-107 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3309 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 2260 (2016).
95. See infra Table 2.
96. See infra Table 2; see also Legal Status of Payday Loans by State, PAYDAY LOAN CONSUMER
INFO., http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information [https://perma.cc/NK76-SPZG] (last visited Oct.
17, 2016).
97. See supra Part IV.A.

SKIBA_XIAO_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2017]

CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING

5/10/2017 9:52 PM

133

default,98 and Carter et al. demonstrated that longer loan lengths had very little
effect on the likelihood of repayment and renewal of payday loans.99 However,
Skiba and Tobacman showed that borrowers tend to mispredict their ability to
repay payday loans;100 this contributes to customers rolling over their loans
multiple times only to end up in debt traps. Thus, the fourth measure of
restricting the number of renewals may improve consumer welfare, but
monitoring compliance with such regulations has proven difficult.101
With little empirical work on funding, it is difficult to know whether limiting
some aspects of funding will be beneficial. However, restrictions on various
characteristics of nonrecourse loans are inadvisable for three reasons. First,
finding the optimal parameters for such restrictions is difficult. Financiers and
consumers are heterogeneous: financiers have distinct costs of capital, and
consumers likely have different opinions on whether maximizing the size of their
cash advance or their share of lawsuit proceeds most benefits them. Second,
limiting different aspects of funding will hurt low-income borrowers. Arkansas,
Colorado, Indiana, and Tennessee have interest rate caps that make it
unprofitable for most funders to operate in these states.102 Policymakers may
have good intentions in limiting interest rates; they may see funding as a valuable
alternative credit source for those in need and want to lower the price to make it
less costly for low-income consumers. However, in setting extremely low rates,
these policymakers cause the supply of funding to dry up as financiers pull away.
Plaintiffs who take up nonrecourse advances are likely liquidity-constrained and
have low incomes. Some funding consumers are likely to be among the payday
borrowing population. As legal financiers leave states with very low interest rate
caps,103 these consumers may resort to payday lending or other forms of more
costly capital, through which they may end up in debt traps while waiting for
lawsuit proceeds. Thus, the unavailability of nonrecourse loans mostly hurts
those who have the greatest need and have very few, if any, financial options.
Finally, financiers may engage in strategic actions to render funding
restrictions ineffective. It is common for companies to adjust their behavior to
get around regulations. For example, Delaware limits the number of loans per
year that payday loan consumers can take out.104 To evade this policy, payday
lenders in Delaware have reclassified themselves as installment lenders, allowing

98. Dobbie & Skiba, supra note 91, at 256.
99. See Susan Payne Carter et al., The Effect of Having More Time to Repay a Payday Loan:
Implications for Understanding Borrower Myopia 2 (Working Paper, 2017).
100. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 60, at 2–3.
101. See Skiba, supra note 17, at 1045.
102. See infra Table 3.
103. See Andrew G. Simpson, Litigation Financing Firm Exits Tennessee as New Law Goes into
Effect, INS. J. (July 3, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2014/07/03/333772.htm
[https://perma.cc/7WTZ-9XS9].
104. SUSANNA MONTEZEMOLO, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LENDING ABUSES
AND PREDATORY PRACTICES 4 n.11 (2013), http://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/
reports/10-Payday-Loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX65-FUPH].
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them to offer an unrestricted number of loans.105 Similarly, payday lenders in
Ohio have reclassified themselves as mortgage lenders to avoid payday loan
laws.106 In regard to consumer litigation funding, Maine prohibits financiers from
assessing fees forty-two months after the contract date; Nebraska and Tennessee
prohibit funders from accruing fees thirty-six months after the contract date.107
There are a number of actions that funders can take in response to such laws.
Financiers may stop funding lawsuits with long repayment horizons (for example,
medical malpractice cases108) or may fund cases only in the latter stages of
litigation, which have less uncertainty about their settlement prospects. Some
firms may shift their capital to higher value claims to maximize revenues. Others
in Maine and Nebraska may choose to hike up prices for the months during which
fees can be charged; financiers cannot do this in Tennessee because Tennessee
also caps interest and fees. Any of these financier actions would render the
original duration restrictions ineffective.
C. Disclosure Regulations
Payday loans are subject to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).109 TILA
requires lenders to reveal the cost of the loan, including finance charges and
APR, in a clear and conspicuous manner.110 Some states have additional
disclosure provisions in their consumer credit statutes.111 Two recurring types of
provisions are payday loan purpose statements and state consumer finance
authority information clauses.112 Nine states require financiers to tell their
customers that payday loans are intended to address short-term needs and are
not long-term solutions.113 Twelve states mandate that lenders provide
information to borrowers about the state financial department that is in charge
of regulating payday loans so that borrowers can contact the department with any
concerns.114

105. Id.
106. Payday Lenders Adept at Evading State Law, Democratic Committee Staff Report Finds, U.S.
HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS. DEMOCRATS (June 16, 2016), http://democrats.financialservices.house
.gov [https://perma.cc/48JZ-CF2A].
107. See infra Table 3.
108. A medical malpractice lawsuit can take, on average, five years from injury to case resolution.
David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation,
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2027 (2006).
109. Truth in Lending, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY,
https://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-protection/truth-in-lending/index-truth-in-lending
.html [https://perma.cc/H67R-WG92] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017).
110. Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be
Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 69 (2004).
111. See infra Table 2.
112. See infra Table 2.
113. See infra Table 2.
114. See infra Table 2.
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TILA does not automatically cover legal finance because funders arguably do
not qualify as “creditors” under the Act.115 However, a state’s usury statute may
incorporate TILA obligations, and if a court finds a nonrecourse advance to be a
loan in that state, then funding will be subject to TILA requirements. Colorado
is the only state that has decided at the supreme court level that funding is a
loan.116 To date, states that regulate legal finance by statute have set their own
disclosure provisions including (1) a minimum font size, (2) itemization of onetime fees, (3) provision of a schedule of repayments, and (4) disclosure of the
APR. These state laws are similar to TILA requirements because both mandate
that the same information—finance charges and APRs—be disclosed.
Though normal disclosure regulations involving APR and fees may be
effective for payday lending, different disclosures may be needed for litigation
finance because funding’s relationship to litigation hides its effect on the
consumer’s cash flow and complicates the repayment calculus. Instead of giving
the plaintiff a very complicated contract with an itemization of various fees, a
repayment schedule, and the APR, the funder should give the plaintiff an
estimate of how much he will owe and when the amount owed will be due. Refer
back to the example in part III and assume that the financier predicts the case
will settle twenty-four months after the contract date. Under this proposal, the
financier should directly disclose that the plaintiff will owe the financier $3,400—
$1,000 for the principal and $2,400 in fees—on X date, which is twenty-four
months after the date of the funding agreement. Such a disclosure would focus
the consumer’s attention on the cost of the advance and obviate the consumer’s
need to do any additional calculations.
Although funders will likely require a few years of experience (and thus a
phase-in period) prior to being able to generate precise estimates of repayment
amount and due date, such approximations are feasible. The workings of the
insurance industry demonstrate clearly how data analysis can help with profit and
loss predictions. Insurance companies possess software to analyze case
characteristics and eventual payment outcomes.117 After they gather enough data
points, these companies use the software to generate estimates of what different
cases are worth, and they are also able to predict their profits and losses.118
Likewise, financiers can invest in software to analyze case characteristics and
repayment outcomes. They can use the software to predict funding durations, as
well as profits and losses.
One counterargument to this proposal may be that the plaintiff can get a case
duration estimate from his attorney and then figure out what he will owe and

115. Martin, supra note 110, at 69.
116. Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 401 (Colo. 2015).
117. See, e.g., MARK ROMANO & J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., LOW BALL: AN
INSIDER’S LOOK AT HOW SOME INSURERS CAN MANIPULATE COMPUTERIZED SYSTEMS TO
BROADLY UNDERPAY INJURY CLAIMS 1 (2012), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Studies.Computer
Claims06-04-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XB-8XG8].
118. Id. at 2–3.
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when he must pay. Experienced attorneys may be able to generate case duration
predictions, but financiers should do so instead for several reasons. First, funders
can generate more precise estimates. Though attorneys can predict when cases
will settle from their filing dates, plaintiffs obtain nonrecourse advances at
different stages of litigation. Financiers can better assess repayment dates by
conducting data analysis with the filing, funding, and repayment dates from
previous cases. Next, attorneys’ estimates center on case characteristics, whereas
funders’ estimates take into consideration statutory liens and other debts because
funders are not first in priority to get the case proceeds. Also, attorneys’ estimates
are generally derived from their own funded and unfunded cases. Financiers’
estimates are from only funded cases, across various attorneys. In a working
paper, Xiao shows that access to funding increases claim payment and duration
of medical malpractice claims.119 This provides evidence that the litigation
outcomes of funded cases differ from unfunded ones. Thus, financiers have more
relevant samples. Additionally, financiers’ samples have more predictive power
because they include data across attorneys and are likely larger. In sum, funders’
rather than attorneys’ estimates may be more precise and appropriate for
consumers to get a sense of when and how much the repayment will be.
The second reason that financiers should have the burden of generating
estimates is that producing precise approximations is costly due to the technology
required. If the obligation of providing these approximations rested on attorneys,
attorneys may start charging fees, making such predictions available only to
plaintiffs with more resources. Third, there may be legal reasons why attorneys
should not give these predictions. For example, questions may arise concerning
whether attorneys are agents of financiers for liability purposes. Finally, even if
attorneys could easily give consumers precise case-duration estimates, many
consumers may lack the financial and contractual literacy, as well as the impetus,
to put the lawsuit information from their attorneys together with information
from the funding agreements in order to generate accurate repayment amounts
and dates.
The proposed disclosure policy not only obviates the need for financially and
contractually unsophisticated consumers to make complex judgments related to
litigation and connect these assessments to repayment of nonrecourse advances,
but it also mitigates the problem of potentially waiving attorney-client privilege
and work-product doctrine protection.120 By placing the legal burden on
financiers to make precise predictions, financiers hopefully will cease attempting
to extract case value and duration estimates from plaintiffs’ attorneys in order to
figure out the profitability of these advances. If plaintiffs’ attorneys provide these

119. See Jean Xiao, The Effect of Consumer Litigation Funding on Medical Malpractice Litigation
(Working Paper, 2017).
120. For how funding relates to attorney-client privilege, see generally Grace M. Giesel, Alternative
Litigation Finance and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 95 (2014). For how funding
relates to the work product doctrine, see generally Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and
the Work-Product Doctrine, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083 (2012).

SKIBA_XIAO_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2017]

CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING

5/10/2017 9:52 PM

137

estimates, then the predictions and any accompanying information may lose
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Currently, the laws
surrounding funding, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product
doctrine are unsettled and vary in different jurisdictions.121 This article’s proposal
encourages financiers to collect their own data in order to generate estimates of
repayment amounts and dates and to calculate their own profits and losses.
Under the proposal, financiers will need only case information that would be
disclosed to defendants anyway in order for defendants to make settlement
offers; that is, financiers will require only non-confidential information.
Though some literature documents the failure of disclosure laws,122 these laws
may work for funding if they are coupled with attorney acknowledgments. One
of the main reasons why disclosure laws do not work is because firms
intentionally hide disclosures or prevent consumers from reading them.123 With
funding, borrowers have access to the attorney that is representing them in their
underlying case. Currently, five states—Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, and
Tennessee—have provisions in their funding statutes that require a written
acknowledgment by the plaintiff’s attorney that verifies that the attorney has
reviewed the contract and all disclosures related to the cost of the nonrecourse
loan have been made.124 This way, the attorney can confirm that the financier has
actually revealed the necessary information in an understandable way. Such
acknowledgments can stop financiers from burying the costs deep in the contract
or attempting to pressure plaintiffs into signing before reviewing the disclosures.
V
CONCLUSION
Consumer litigation funding is not just another form of payday lending.
Funding has similarities with payday lending because they are both alternative
financial services, involve high interest rates, and cater to customers who need
money for living expenses. However, they differ in ways that regulators should
recognize. Many justify bans on payday lending by pointing to the fact that
millions of borrowers every year are getting stuck in an inescapable cycle of
interest payments. While legal finance has real costs, funding’s nonrecourse
nature prevents consumers from getting stuck in a cyclical repayment of debt.
Moreover, prohibitions may not be appropriate at this time because there is little
empirical evidence on how funding affects consumer welfare and there is room
for interest rates to fall as the industry continues to expand and competition
121. See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 6.09(B)(5)(a)–(b), at 140–42 (2012) (discussing the attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine in relation to disclosing information to a funder).
122. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1321–
26 (2015); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647 (2011).
123. Willis, supra note 122, at 1322–24.
124. IND. CODE § 24-12-2-1 (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-104 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3303
(2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2016); TENN. CODE § 47-16-104 (2016).
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increases among funders. States should take the initiative to partner with
financiers to study the effect of this new form of credit on borrowers.
Both payday loans and funding can help consumers who are in financial
distress. Appropriate regulation is necessary to make sure cash-constrained
consumers are making informed choices. Though funding’s nonrecourse nature
makes it less dangerous for customers, its tie to litigation makes it more difficult
for customers to truly understand its price. It is cognitively cumbersome for
consumers to link how lawsuit proceeds relate to income. They experience almost
no pain of paying to help them assess the costs. To address consumer
understanding, some states have implemented disclosure regulations that
mandate that funders itemize the fees, present a repayment schedule, and relay
the APR. However, customers do not have the legal expertise or financial
sophistication to estimate case duration and to put this information together with
funding contract terms to get an accurate sense of where they may end up on a
repayment schedule. Thus, financiers should disclose a reasonable approximate
repayment amount and date to improve borrowers’ understanding of the costs of
nonrecourse advances.
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Table 2. Payday Lending State Policies as of Year 2016125
State

Alabama

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas

California

Colorado
Connecticut
D.C.

Express Bans
and Caps on
Interest
Rate/Fees
*456.25%
APR for 14day $100 loan
*520% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*Express ban
*Express ban
*459% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan
*20% interest
for first $0–
300 and then
additional
7.5% for
$301–500
*Express ban
*Express ban

Restrictions on Loan
Characteristics

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: 10–31 days
*max # rollovers: 1
*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: min 14 days
*max # rollovers: 2

Disclosure
Regulations
in Addition to TILA
Requirements

*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints

*$300 max loan amount
*loan term: max 31 days
*max # rollovers: 0
*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: min 6
months
*max # rollovers: 1
rollover at 45% interest

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: max 60 days
*max # rollovers: 4

*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs

Delaware

Florida
Georgia

*419% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan
*Express ban

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: 7–31 days
*max # rollovers: 0

125. In addition to our own research using Westlaw and LexisNexis, we also obtained information
from paydayloaninfo.org.
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*459% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*$600 max loan amount
*loan term: 32 days
*max # rollovers: 0

Hawaii
*$1000 max loan
amount
*max # rollovers: 3

Idaho
*403% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*max loan amount: the
minimum of $1000 or
25% gross monthly
income
*loan term: 13–45 days
*max # rollovers: 0

*390% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

* max loan amount: the
minimum of $550 or
20% gross monthly
income
*loan term: min 14 days
*max # rollovers: 0

Illinois

Indiana
*433% APR
for 14-day
Iowa
$100 loan
*390% APR
for 14-day
Kansas
$100 loan
*459% APR
for 14-day
Kentucky
$100 loan
*780% APR
for 14-day
Louisiana
$100 loan
Maine
*Express ban
Maryland
*Express ban
Massachusetts *Express ban

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: max 31 days
*max # rollovers: 0
*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: 7–30 days
*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: 14–60 days
*max # rollovers: 0
*$350 max loan amount
*loan term: max 60 days
*max # rollovers: 0

[Vol. 80:117

*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
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*390% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*$600 max loan amount
*loan term: max 31 days
*max # rollovers: 0

*390% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan
*520% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*$350 max loan amount
*loan term: max 30 days
*max # rollovers: 0
*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: under $250,
max 30 days; $250–500,
28–30 days
*max # rollovers: 0
*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: 14–31 days
*max # rollovers: 6
*$300 max loan amount
*loan term: max 31 days

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

*1950% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan
*36% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

Montana

Nebraska

*459% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

Nevada
*36% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

New
Hampshire
New Jersey

New Mexico

*Express ban
*416% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: max 34 days
*max # rollovers: 0
* max loan amount:
25% gross monthly
income
*loan term: max 35 days
*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: 7–30 days
*max # rollovers: 0

*$2500 max loan
amount
*loan term: 14–35 days
*max # rollovers: 0

141

*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints

*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints

*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
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*Express ban
*Express ban
*520% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan
*28% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: max 60 days
*max # rollovers: 1
*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: min 31 days
*max # rollovers: 0

*390% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: 12–45 days
*max # rollovers: 0

*156% APR
for 31-day
loan
*Express ban
*260% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan
*390% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*loan term: min 31 days
*max # rollovers: 2

*459% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

*$425 max loan amount
for $500 check
*loan term: max 31 days
*max # rollovers: 0

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon
Pennsylvania

Rhode Island
South
Carolina

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: min 13 days
*max # rollovers: 1
*$550 max loan amount
*loan term: max 31 days
*max # rollovers: 0
*$500 max loan amount
*max # rollovers: 4

South Dakota

Tennessee

[Vol. 80:117

*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
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*309.47%
APR for 14day $100 loan

*loan term: 7–31 days
*max # rollovers: 0

Texas
*loan term: less than 70
days

Utah
Vermont

*Express ban
*687.76%
APR for 14day $100 loan

Virginia
*390% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

Washington
West Virginia

*Express ban

Wisconsin

Wyoming

*$500 max loan amount
*loan term: min 2 pay
periods
*max # rollovers: 0
* max loan amount: the
minimum of $700 or
30% gross monthly
income
*loan term: max 45 days
*max # rollovers: 0

*780% APR
for 14-day
$100 loan

* max loan amount: the
minimum of $1500 or
35% gross monthly
income
*loan term: max 90 days
*max # rollovers: 1
*loan term: 1 month
*max # rollovers: 0

143

*payday loans
meant to address
short-term needs
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
*state agency’s
contact information
for customer’s
concerns and
complaints
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Table 3. Consumer Litigation Funding State Policies as of Year 2016126
State

Arkansas
Colorado

Indiana

Caps on
Interest
Rate/Fees
*17% per year

Restrictions on
Loan Characteristics

*Minimum font size
*APR disclosure
*Truth in Lending Act
requirements

*Depends on
amount
charged; highest
potential cap is
36% per year
*36% per year

Maine

*Shall not assess
fees exceeding 42
months after
contract date

Nebraska

*Shall not assess
fees exceeding 36
months after
contract date

Ohio

Oklahoma

Disclosure
Regulations

*Minimum font size
*Itemization of onetime fees
*Schedule of
repayments
*Minimum font size
*Itemization of onetime fees
*Schedule of
repayments
*APR disclosure
*Minimum font size
*Itemization of onetime fees
*Schedule of
repayments
*APR disclosure
*Minimum font size
*Itemization of onetime fees
*Schedule of
repayments
*APR disclosure
*Minimum font size
*Itemization of onetime fees
*Schedule of
repayments

126. This table includes information from state statutes and state supreme court cases.
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*Effectively
46% per year

*Shall not assess
fees exceeding 36
months after
contract date

145

*Minimum font size
*APR disclosure

*Minimum font size
*Itemization of onetime fees
*Schedule of
repayments
*APR disclosure

